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IN 7HE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------
---------------------------------------
VELMA GLADYS YATES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, 
a project of Division of Family and 
Community Medicine, University of 
Utah; UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL; 
VERNAL DRUG COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and GORDON LEE 
BALK A, M. D. , 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16602 
This was an action for alleged medical malpract-
ice, controlled by the Utah Heal th Care Malpractice Act, 
Section 78-14-1, et seq. (All statutory references are to 
the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, unless otherwise 
indicated.) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The action was dismissed for failure to comply 
with Section 78-14-8 (1979, as amended), requiring notice of 
intent to bring an action as a condition precedent to suit. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Balka seeks an affirmation of the tri~ 
court's Order dismissing the suit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant had been a patient of respondent Gordo~ 
Lee Balka, M.D., for a period of some fifteen months prior 
to March of 1977. During this period, respondent Balka 
prescribed various medications in his treatment of appel-
lant. These prescriptions were filled by respondent Vernal 
Drug Company. On March 12, 1977, appellant was admitted to 
respondent Uintah County Hospital in a "disoriented ana 
incoherent" condition, apparently the result of consuming 
large and excessive quantities of the prescribed drugs. She 
developed "continual convulsive seizures" and on approxirnat-
ely .March 15, 1977, she was transferred to a hospital in 
Salt Lake County. The seizures were controlled and on April 
6, 1977, appellant was re-admitted to respondent Uintah 
County Hospital where she remained until her dis charge on 
April 1 2, 197 7. 
On April 7, 1978, a letter was sent to respondent 
Balka (and three other respondents). The letter was signec 
by appellant's husband, 11arzine Yates as claimant, and bi' 
his 2ttorney, Robert M. McRae, in the express capacity of 
"Attorney for Claimant". The text of the letter clearli' 
differentiates appellant (who is referred to as "claimant'' 
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wife") from her husband. The letter gives notice that 
appellant's husband, not appellant, 
"potentially is asserting and claiming and may 
commence a ~ivil act~on for damages arising 
out of possible negligent [professional con-
duct]". 
On July 19, 1978, appellant, not her husband, 
filed an action claiming medical malpractice. While the 
Complaint established only one cause of action, the alleged 
wrongful conduct consisted of three "counts": First, the 
prescribing of the medications; second, the furnishing of 
the same; third, the care appellant received while in Uintah 
County Hospital during March of 1977. 
Appellant further claimed that in March of 1978 it 
was discovered that she was suffering from "permanent cen-
tral nervous system disorders," caused by the alleged neg-
ligent conduct. 
On August 7, 1978, respondent Balka filed his 
Answer, which established four defenses. The fourth defense 
is relevant here. It alleged that appellant had failed to 
file a Notice of Intent to Commence Action as required by 
the Utah Health Care ~lalpractice Act, specifically Section 
78-14-8, u.c.A. (1979, as amended). 
Respondent Balka's response gave appellant notice 
of his failure to comply with the Act. Nevertheless, appel-
lant refused to file a proper notice, contending that the 
April 7 letter was sufficient. The trial court disagreed, 
-3-
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and on July 25, 1979, after tl,e statute of limitations had 
run on appellant's cause of action, issued its order dismis-
sing appellant's Complaint on the grounds of failure to file 
a Notice of Intent to Co~~ence Action as required. 
This appeal followed. 
L 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPEHLY DISMISSED 
BECA'JSE OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WI'I'H THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARJ:: /1Jl.J,PRACTICE ACT 
In his action, appellant failed to comply wi.th 
78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979, as amended). This section requires a 
potential plaintiff in a health care malpractice action to 
issue a prescribed form of notice prior to initiating an 
action. In the instant case there has been neither "strict" 
nor even "substantial", complaince with the statute. 
The statute states: 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence 
action. No malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be initiated un-
less and until the plaintiff gives the pros-
pective defendant or his executor or succes-
sor, at least ninety days' prior notice of 
intent to commence an action. Such notice 
shall include a general statement of the nat-
ure of the claim, the persons involved, the 
date, time and place of the occurrence, the 
circumstances thereof, specific allegations 
of misconduct on the part of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries 
and other damages sustained. Notice may be 
in letter or affidavit form executed by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. Service shall be 
accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for thr2 service of tlle sumJC,ons and 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
complaint in a civil action or by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, in which case 
notice shall be deemed to have been served on 
the date of mailing. Such notice shall be 
served within the time allowed for commencing 
a malpractice action against a health care 
provider. If the notice is served less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the 
applicable time period, the time for commenc-
ing the malpractice action against the health 
care provider shall be extended to 120 days 
from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of deter-
mining its retroactivity, not be construed as 
relating to the limitation on the time for com-
mencing any action, and shall apply only to 
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 
1976. This section shall not apply to third 
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The notice must be given by the plaintiff (not by 
a relative of the plaintiff), and it must be signed by the 
plaintiff, or the plaintiff's attorney (as opposed to the 
attorney of a family member). 
Under the pertinent statute (and the statute as it 
existed prior to amendment) the letter which appellant 
asserts gives the required notice is clearly defective. The 
letter is written on the letterhead of Robert M. McRae & 
Associates, and it states: 
April 7, 1978 
"Pursuant to 78-14-8 UCA, notice is here-
with given that Harzine Yates, husband of Velma 
Yates, potentially is asserting and claiming 
and may co~~ence a civil action for damages 
arising out of possible negligent prescribing, 
negligent dispensing of drugs or other forms of 
prescribed medicine, and negligent hospitaliza-
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tion and treatment of his wife. In compliance 
with the aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it 
is believed and will be alleged in the event a 
civil action is co~nenced that from approxim-
ately March, 1976 until March, 1978, claimant's 
wife received prescriptions from the Vernal Drug 
Company believed to have been prescribed by Dr. 
Lee Balka in his official capacity as a partner 
or responsible agent of the Vernal Family Health 
Center, which prescriptions, in combination of 
use or seperate, were dispensed in an excessive 
amount which has resulted in permanent mental 
damage to claimant's wife. It is further belie-
ved that as a result of the prolonged excess 
abuse of the prescription medication, the seiz-
ure and subsequent coma which claimant's wife 
suffered approximately one year ago were possib-
ly the result of negligence." 
The "claimant", or potential plaintiff, referred 
to in the letter is Marzine Yates. Appellant is only refer-
red to as "claimant's wife". The letter is signed by the 
"claimant", Marzine Yates, and by Robert M. McRae, in the 
capacity of "Attorney for Claimant", not as attorney for 
appellant (i.e. Velma Gladys Yates). Marzine Yates did not 
file a complaint based on the alleged malpractice, rather 
appellant filed the action. This respondent's answer to 
that complaint asserted as a defense the lack of notice a~ 
gave appellant clear and fair warning of the defect in 
sufficient time to effect a cure and preserve the cause of 
action. Nevertheless, appellant (through her attorney) 
refused to submit a proper notice as required by the stat-
ute. 
A statement regarding the general rule as U 
notice requirements in medical malpractice cases is founrl 1n 
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61 Am.Jur.2d 306, Physicians, Surgeons, etc.,§ 180, where 
it states: 
§ 180. Statutory notice of injury. 
Where a statute exists requiring a person 
claiming to have received personal injuries to 
serve a detailed notice, in writing, of such 
injuries upon the person by whom it is claimed 
these injuries were caused, within a limited 
time after the occurrence of such injuries, it 
has been held that the statute applies to act-
ions for malpractice whether they sound in con-
tract or in tort. Such a statute must be str-
ictly complied with, and all matters required 
by the statute to be stated in the notice or 
its equivalent must be stated, or it is not suf-
ficient, and the service of summons, affidavits, 
notice of adverse examination, and subpoena can-
not operate as compliance with the statute where 
one of the essential facts required to be stated 
in the notice is omitted therefrom. Such a stat-
ute, properly speaking, is not a statute of limi-
tations. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above state~ent refers to statutes dealing with personal 
injury claims generally, while the Utah statute in question 
is specifically directed at medical malpractice actions. 
The significance of this is discussed below, as it relates 
to effectuating the public purpose which the statute seeks 
to serve. 
In Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978), this 
court held that the notice requirement of § 78-14-8 is 
constitutional (see Point II of this brief), that giving 
notice serves to "toll" the statute of limitations (by means 
of extension) when necessary to preserve an action, and that 
the filing and service of a complaint (which necessarily 
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contains all the information required in the notice) does 
not satisfy the statute's notice requirements. 
The importance of Vealey, supra, as it relates ~ 
the case at bar is that there, as here, the appellant asser-
tea that a document, containing the pertinent information 
required by the statute, constituted compliance with the 
statute. That complaint contained virtually every itm 
required by the statute, never-the-less this court held: 
• • that the statute requires notice to be 
given ninety days before the action is filed." 
The complaint was not eguivalant to the required notice, and 
therefore was properly dismissed. Further, the filing of 
the complaint, as such, would not serve to extend the satu~ 
of limitations. 
Here, unlike Vealey, the purported notice did not 
contain the essential facts required by the statute. Most 
notably, it did not indicate who the plaintiff would be. 
Moreover, it was misleading as to the nature of the cause of 
action asserted. By reference to the letter in question, ' 
one would only be appraised of Mr. Yates' potential action 
to recover medical and other expenses and for loss of his 
wife's services and consortium. In fact, Mr. Yates was 
never the plaintiff in any action based on the letter and 
the letter failed to give notice of the action filed by 
appellant. When compared to the asserted "notice" in 
Vealey, a fortiori the letter here is insufficient to serve 
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notice as required by Section 78-14-8 U.C.A. (1979). 
This court addressed the notice requirement in the 
recent case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 
1979). In Foil the court held that the statute of limit-
ations in medical malpractice actions commences to run from 
the date of the injury or from the date the injury was 
discovered or should have been discovered by the person 
inj urea. 1 Also at issue in Foil was whether Section 78-12-
40 U.C.A. (1953) operated to toll the statute of limitations 
when no notice as required by Section 78-14-8, u.c.A. (1979) 
had been filed within the statutory period. 
The significance of Foil is to be found in certain 
dicta which provides a guide to the proper construction to 
be given the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in general, 
and Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979), in particular. 
In the Foil case (at pages 4 and 5 of the advance 
sheets) it states: 
•• it is important to keep in focus 
the proposition that that section deals only 
with malpractice actions against health care 
providers; it is not a general statute of 
limitation on personal injury actions as such." 
"One of the chief purposes of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act was to prevent the 
filing of unjustified lawsuits against health 
care providers, with all the attendant costs, 
economic and otherwise, that such suits entail." 
1(The term "discovered" is here loos ly used. "Discovery" of the 
inJury relates not only to the mere act of injury, but also to 
the fact that it was caused by an ac of medical malpractice.) 
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And at page 8, specifically dealing with the statute in 
question here: 
Section 78-14-8 merely prescribes a condition 
precedent to the filing of a summons or a com-
plaint. A failure to comply with such condi-
tions does not constitute an adjudication on 
the merits, but is merely a procedural defect 
that does not relate to the merits of the basic 
action in any way. There are numerous instan-
ces in which the law requires fulfillment of a 
condition precedent before the filing of a com-
plaint, and failure to comply with the condition 
may result in a dismissal, but not on the merits. 
Obviously, notice as per Section 78-14-8 U.C.A. 
(1979) is required, regardless of the tolling statute and 
such notice is a condition precedent which must be met 
before a medical malpractice action may be brought. While 
the condition precedent is merely procedural, compliance is 
never-the-less mandatory. 
As to the purpose of the recent amendment ~ 
Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979), at p.10 in Foil, the court 
states: 
"The amendment to §78-14-8 was made to 
establish the Legislature's intent that a not-
ice of intent to sue was not the operative fact 
in the co~~encement of an action and that the 
notice was not applicable to causes of action 
arising prior to enactment of the Malpractice 
Act. In part, at least, the amendment was in 
response to this Court's holding in Vealey. 
Changes made in §78-14-8 are strictly and purely 
remedial in nature. They do not serve to create 
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or eliminate any vested interests or causes of 
action. They simply govern technical provisions 
for the bringing of a malpractice action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The amendment obviously has no effect on the notice require-
ment in this case. 
The most significant aid to the proper construe-
tion of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to be found 
in the text of the statute itself. Section 78-14-2, U.C.A. 
(1953), states: 
"In enacting this act, it is the purpose 
of the legislature to provide a reasonable 
time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers while limiting that time 
to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably 
and accurately calculated; and to provide other 
procedural changes to expedite early evalua-
tions and settlement of claims." 
The patent intention of the legislature was to protect the 
public's interest in a sound heal th care system from the 
many adverse effects which necessarily attend the current 
sharp increases in medical malpractice cases. The primary 
device to achieve this end is the availability of reasonable 
malpractice insurance for Utah's health care providers and 
the provisions of the Act are designed to provide a favor-
able environment for such insurance. Specifically, limita-
tions are placed on the bringing of medical malpractice 
actions to facilitate reasonable and accurate calculation of 
malpractice insurance premiums. The procedures chosen are 
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further expressly designed to facilitate "early evaluation 
and settlement of claims." 
The clear intent is to restrict medical malprac-
tice actions. In addition to the requirement of notice, the 
legislature provided a comprehensive satute of limitations 
(78-14-4}; fully spelled out all elements, as well as defe~ 
ses, to actions based on informed consent (78-14-5); and 
expressly required a written instrument as a prerequisite to 
an action for breach of guarantee on contract in the medical 
malpractice field ( 78-14-6). In order to further this 
policy, a strict standard of compliance with the statutory 
procedures is required. 
practice 
general) 
The concept of requiring notice for medical mal-
cases (and indeed for personal injury actions in 
is not new. State legislatures have long recog-
nized the beneficial effects that flow from requiring prior 
notice in such lawsuits, including, of course, the discour-
aging of frivolous suits, and the encouraging of settle-
ments, thus avoiding protracted, and often undesirab~ 
litigation. 
Our notice statute is plain, unambiguous, and easy 
to comply with. Indeed, appellant, through her attorney, 
was aware of the insufficiencies of the letter as notice a~ 
had ample opportunity to cure any defects. If the statute 
is to be altered, it is for the legislature, not the courts, 
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to effect the change. If the purposes of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act are to be effectuated, substance must 
be given to it's provisions. The procedures which it sets 
out must be complied with. These procedures are specifical-
ly designed to meet dangers to the public welfare, as per-
ceived by the legislature. The trial court correctly held 
that a procedural condition precedent to bringing a medical 
malpractice action, had not been complied with, and there-
fore properly dismissed the action. 
II. 
THE NOTICE OF INTENT REQUIRED BY § 78-14-8 
U.C.A. (1979) DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The recent case of McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (1979) answers appellant's 
contention that§ 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is special legisla-
tion. It was there argued that the 1979 amendment to that 
section was prohibited special legislation. This court 
disagreed, noting: 
"That contention cannot withstand analysis. 
In Utah Farm Bureau Insuance Co. v. Utah Insur-
ance Guaranty Association, Utah, 564 P.2d 751 
(1977), this Court defined a general law as one 
which applies to and operates uniformly upon all 
members of any class of persons. The 1979 amend-
ment clearly operates uniformly upon a class of 
persons: all persons having a cause of action 
arising prior to the effective date of the Mal-
practice Act, whether they have been filed or not 
••• The a:nendrrcent therefore stands on the same 
basis, as to tne generality of its application, 
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as does the original notice of intent to sue pro-
vision and the statute of limitations 2rovision ~ 
the Act. 
{Emphasis added, p.788) 
The McGuire case is obviously sufficient authority 
to uphold the constitutionality of the disputed statute. 
Appellant asserts that § 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979), 
violates three provisions of the Utah Constitution and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The following Utah Constitu-
tional provisions are allegedly offended: 
laws. 
Article I §2 [All political power inherent 
in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and bene-
fit, and they have the right to alter or re-
form their government as the public welfare 
may require. 
Article I §24 [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Article VI §26 (Private laws forbidden.] 
No private or special law shall be enacted 
where a geneal law can be applicable. 
Appellant argues denial of equal protection of the 
Of significant note is the absence of an allege1i 
violation of due process of law under either the Fouctcent 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Ar-ticlc I C, 
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of the Utah Constitution. 
The claim that§ 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) violates 
the Utah Constitution is clearly untenable in light of the 
extensive pronouncements by this Court on the subject of 
equal protection and general versus special legislation. 
The general rule is that doubts as to the constitutionality 
of satutes are to be resolved in favor of the statute's 
validity. In Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair, 57 Utah 
516, 196 P.2d 221 (1921), a law requiring chiropractors to 
be licensed was attacked on a variety of grounds. The 
Court, in upholding the statutory scheme, conceded that 
certain of appellant's arguments "had merit" but concluded: 
Should it be conceded that the contention 
renders doubtful the validity of the re-
quirement that chiropractors have a know-
ledge of materia medica and some other 
subjects referred to in the statute, it 
would not render the law invalid, because 
when there is any reasonable doubt as to 
the validity of a statute, the doubt must 
be resolved in favor of validity. It is 
only where the invalidity or unconstitu-
tio'nali ty is clear and beyond civil law 
that the courts have the right to declare 
a law, or any part of the same, invalid. 
(Emphasis added, p.225) 
Under such a standard, the instant appellant's 
assertion of unconstitutionality cannot prevail. At the 
very most, appellant has raised only "doubts" as to the 
invalidity of § 78-14-8. More specifically, the law of Utah 
places on the party challenging the statute the burden of 
proving unconstitutionality. If a rational relation exists 
-15-
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between the classification and the purpose of the statute, 
the statute must be upheld. A classification is never 
unreasonable or arbitrary if a reasonable basis exists anc 
there is uniform application of the act. See Utah Fan 
Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc., 56\ 
P.2d 751 (Utah, 1977). 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as well as under the Constitution of 
Utah, only a reasonable relation between the classification 
and the purpose of the statute, and uni form application, are 
required to withstand attacks based on a denial of equal 
protection. As is amply illustrated in Point I of this 
brief, such a reasonable relation surely exists here. 
Indeed, in the case at bar there exists not only a 
"reasonable relation," but also the compelling state inte~ 
est that is the essence of the "strict scrutiny" whid 
appellant erroneously asserts is applicable here. The 
interest is insuring that an adequate level of professiona: 
medical care is available to the people of Utah. The legis-
lature has found that in order to achieve this state o' 
interest, it is necessary to control the "crisis" of medic~ 
malpractice insurance via the comprehensive scheme of tb, 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The notice provision o: 
78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is clearly and directly related tc 
early claims settlement and to discouraging frivolou 
suits. Both of those o!:ijectives have the effect of decree: 
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ing medical malpractice insurance premiums. The notice 
provision, 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is not objectionable as 
denying equal protection. 
Appellant makes the further (although related) 
claim that 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) constitutes forbidden 
special legislation. Appellant's brief states that: 
.•• "No justification exists 
ling out the medical profession and 
it with procedural protection not 
other groups." •.• 




Appellant demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of 
the nature of the procedures mandated by 78-14-8, U.C.A. 
(1979). The statute's purpose is to protect the public 
interest in adequate medical care, not the interests of 
physicians who would seek to avoid malpractice suits. 
al law. 
states: 
Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is clearly a gener-
In U.F.B.I. Co. v. U.I.G.A., supra, the Court 
.•. a law is general when it applies equally 
to all persons embraced in a class founded upon 
some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional dis-
tinction. It is special legislation if it con-
fers particular privileges or imposes peculiar 
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the 
exercise of a common right; upon a class of per-
sons arbitrarily selected, from the general body 
of those who stand in precisely the same rela-
tion to the subject of the law. The constitu-
tional prohibition of special legislation does 
not preclude legislative classification, but 
only requires the classification to be reasonable. 
{p.754) 
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Medical malpractice plaintiffs stand in a differ-
ent position than plaintiffs in other professional malprac-
t ice act ions. The difference lies in the vital importance 
to society of insuring adequate medical care. Sect ion 78-
14-8, U.C.A. (1979) helps to meet that interest of society, 
and it does so in a fair and equitable manner. It operates 
uniformly on all those within a class, namely, plaintiffs in 
health care malpractice actions. It clearly meets all 
constitutional requirements, and must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the notice required by Section 78-14-B, 
U.C.A. ( 1979) is clearly valid under the Constitution of 
Utah, and as such notice, a condition precedent to a medic~ 
malpractice action was not given in the case at bar the 
order of dismissal of appellant's cause of action must be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 
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